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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OGDEN CITY CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah municipal ) 
corporation, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
, Plaintiff-Appellee ) 
vs ) 
JAMES WESTON DECKER, ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Defendant-Appellant ) Docket No. 20110051CA 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Defendant-Appellant is JAMES WESTON DECKER, a 
natural person, a propertyowner of real estate located in 
Ogden, Weber County, Utah. 
The Plaintiff-Appellee OGDEN CITY CORPORATION is a Utah 
municipal corporation. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OGDEN CITY CORPORATION, ) 
a Utah municipal ) 
corporation, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff-Appellee ) 
vs ) 
JAMES WESTON DECKER, ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Defendant-Appellant ) Docket No. 20110051CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is granted in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 78A-4-103(2)(j), 
Utah Code, and the "pour over" order of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Appellate jurisdiction of this case although arising 
in the justice court is nevertheless valid and 
appropriate, as the appealed issues focus upon the 
constitutionality of the OGDEN CITY ordinance (authorizing 
the assessment of the $500 "per letter" fee), in violation 
of constitutional "due process" standards and limitations, 
particularly in derogation of the relevant Utah statute 
expressly controlling the situation. The imposition of those 
$500 per letter costs, in the face of Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution, when the accused person must pay 
a non-refundable "hearing request fee" in order to challenge 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the imposition of the fees and/or the underlying violation, 
is likewise unconstitutional. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal (and the predicate factual situation 
surrounding it) presents the following issues for review: 
1. That OGDEN CITY, as a political subdivision, 
cannot violate a propertyowner's right of "due 
process of law" by collecting a fee in advance as 
a pre-condition for the exercise of those "due 
process" rights. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's conclusions of 
law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. 
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P. 2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993) . This standard of review has also been 
referred to as a "correction of error standard". 
Jacobsen Investment Company vs State Tax 
, Commission, 839 P. 2d 7 8 9, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 
1992). "Correction of error" means that no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's 
ruling on questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 936 (Utah Supreme Court 1994). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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3. The judgment of the District Court judicially 
upholding and enforcing the "civil fines" 
improperly imposed by the administrative official 
cannot stand and must be set aside. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF APPEAL: See 
comment to #1, above. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in relevant part: 
In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. . . . 
Emphasis added. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant-Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER, a natural 
person, is the owner of certain real estate located at 2026 
Madison Street in Ogden, Weber County, Utah. The real estate 
is subject to the geopolitical "jurisdiction" of the 
Defendant OGDEN CITY, a Utah municipal corporation. 
In 2006 and 2007 code enforcement officers of OGDEN 
CITY concluded that DECKER, as property-owner of the real 
estate, was in violation of several "junk and debris" 
(undersigned's terminology) ordinances of the City, in that 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the real estate had junk, debris, weeds, and similar items 
thereon which had not been removed. 
OGDEN CITY Code Enforcement Officer Robert Porter 
[hereinafter "Officer Porter"] sent to Mr DECKER a "notice 
of violation" concerning the observed situation, and 
administratively assessed and imposed a $125 civil penalty. 
DECKER'S "request for hearing", as indicated and 
invited in Officer Porter's "letter citation", was denied by 
the CITY because of DECKER'S failure to pay the $25 "hearing 
request fee" required by ordinance as a pre-condition to 
granting the hearing. 
Officer Porter re-inspected the parcel, saw essentially 
the same "violation" conditions, and mailed a second "notice 
of violation" to DECKER, this time assessing a $250 penalty 
(ostensibly justified on the basis of the herein-challenged 
OGDEN CITY ordinance providing for the same) because Porter 
had to write the "second" letter to DECKER. Porter 
ultimately wrote over the course of a months-long period 
seven other "notice of violation" letters, for each of which 
he imposed an additional $500 penalty. Eventually the 
aggregate of the "$500 penalties" for each of the "notice of 
violation" letters OGDEN CITY (through and by Officer 
Porter) came to $3875. 
During the course of the bench trial before the 
District Court, uncontroverted evidence was adduced that: 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. OGDEN CITY did not clean up the property, as 
described by Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code 
[hereinafter "the statute"], 
2. OGDEN CITY did not. incur any costs in the 
clean-up and removal of the offending junk 
(because the CITY did not undertake any removal 
efforts). 
3. OGDEN CITY did not forward its bill of costs 
(non-existent, as noted herein) to the Weber 
County authorities, for imposition as a "lien" if 
found to be valid and reasonable by the Weber 
County Board of Commissioners, as the statute 
requires. The municipal Ordinance (allowing the 
per letter fee) doesn't require such. This is the 
basis for Defendant's "no due process" claim: for 
municipal ordinance to impose a fee when state 
statute says it is to go the other way (clean up 
the yard at city expense) and make monetary claim 
against DECKER is a violation of due process. 
4. No criminal charges for the "misdemeanor" 
violations (which were the subject of Officer 
Porter's "notice of violation" letters) were 
brought against DECKER by OGDEN CITY. 
Although DECKER attempted to request a "hearing" on 
underlying matter (i.e. the violations), his request 
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denied by OGDEN CITY personnel because he did not pay the 
by-ordinance required $25 "hearing request fee". [OGDEN CITY 
had no procedure for waiver or deferral of payment of the 
fee.] With no "hearing" and no apparent compliance (i.e. 
clean-up and/or removal of the junk on the premises), 
Officer Porter continued, on almost a bi-weekly basis, to 
send out the "notice of violation" letters to DECKER. 
Ultimately, nine such "notice of violation" letters were 
sent out. 
OGDEN CITY ultimately filed civil suit against DECKER 
for the aggregate value ($3975) of the "notice of violation" 
letters (generally $500 each letter) sent by Officer Porter 
to DECKER. The civil suit was initially heard as a "small 
claims court" matter before the Honorable Andrea Lockwood, 
Judge of the Ogden City Municipal Justice Court. Following 
the entry of judgment against him by the Justice Court, 
DECKER appealed to the Second District Court, Ogden 
Department. 
The "appeal" was heard de novo by District Court Judge 
Michael Direda of the Second District Court, which (on 18 
October 2010) entered judgment against DECKER in the amount 
of the aggregated "$500 per letter" fee. Judge Direda denied 
the Defendant's motions to find the municipal ordinance 
provisions unconstitutional. 
The instant appeal challenges the District Court's 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ruling and judgment concerning the constitutionality of the 
administratively imposed fees. [The Defendant's "guilt" of 
the underlying claimed "violation" is NOT at issue within 
this appeal or from the lower court proceedings: the Ogden 
City Council is without enabling authority to expand the 
"jurisdiction" of the Municipal Justice Court to allow the 
Justice Court to consider within a filed "small claims 
court" (civil) proceeding the accused propertyowner's 
"guilt" of the "violation" filed against him. Likewise, the 
underlying ordinance does not purport to allow the court 
that expanded "jurisdiction". There is, thus, no meaningful 
"due process" opportunity for the accused to challenge the 
assessment of the $500 per letter "penalty" assessed and 
imposed against him.] 
SUMMARIES OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
The arguments of Appellant JAMES WESTON DECKER are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Provisions of the Utah Constitution (Article 
I, Section 7) guarantee that a person not be 
deprived of "property" (which in this case is the 
"civil penalty" of $3875 administratively imposed 
against Defendant DECKER) without "due process of 
law". Article I, Section 12 prevents the 
government from requiring the payment of any fee 
as a pre-condition to secure any of the rights 
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guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. The 
requirement of OGDEN CITY that the accused 
defendant pay a $25 "hearing request fee" as a 
pre-condition to the granting of his request for 
an administrative hearing to challenge the "civil 
penalty" administratively assessed against him 
violates the proscription of Article I, Section 7. 
2. The CITY'S process of administratively 
imposing the "civil penalty" for the claimed 
"weeds and debris" violation without actually 
incurring any costs in the municipal clean-up of 
such debris contradicts the mandatory requirements 
of directly applicable statutory provisions 
(requiring the incurring of the costs for the 
clean-up), thus violating the Defendant's "due 
process of law" rights because the City is 
substantively seeking a result which the 
Legislature has denied to the municipality. 
3 . The applicable municipal ordinances and/or the 
municipal procedures arising therefrom and 
resulting in the administrative imposition of the 
"civil penalty" against the Defendant in 
contradiction to the foregoing constitutional 
guarantees are thus invalid, and any civil 
judgment of the District Court enforcing such 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unconstitutional impositions must be set aside and 
overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
The substantive (i.e. debt collection proceeding) and 
procedural posture of this case has structured but somewhat 
restricted the nature of this case and its appeal, in which 
the "constitutional" claims have been raised. In order to 
properly understand this case and its appeal, the following 
facts and issues must be first understood: 
1. The "civil case" which is the basis for this 
litigation was NOT to determine or ascertain the 
underlying "guilt" of the Defendant (DECKER), as 
propertyowner of the "criminal violation". [This 
element may at first blush appear to be a "civil 
law" prerequisite to the City's monetary recovery, 
but that oversimplifies the analysis. The CITY'S 
claim is based upon the claim by Code Enforcement 
Officer Porter that he alone in a "judge, jury, 
executioner" style had determined the "guilt" 
(or at least the financial culpability) of the 
propertyowner and thus he sent out the letters. 
There was no judicial determination of the 
Defendant's "guilt" of the claimed "violation".] 
2. The CITY is "stuck with" the provisions of its 
ordinance, as well as the conduct of its officials 
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(Porter) taken in compliance thereof. 
3. The CITY cannot be heard to deny the 
strictures of its own ordinance: that is, that the 
propertyowner receiving the administrative "letter 
citation" owes the fee. Any "guilt" determination 
has been made by Code Enforcement Officer Porter 
and that's it: he's acting in a role which quite 
literally makes him judge, jury and executioner, 
in addition to his "accuser" role. That's not 
constitutionally acceptable. 
4. The District Court was requested to determine 
only the "civil liability" of the CITY'S claim 
(for entitlement to the $3875, pursuant to the 
administrative fines Code Enforcement Officer 
Porter administratively assessed against Defendant 
DECKER). 
This is a "civil case", purporting to collect a civil 
indebtedness. The case was originally filed in the "small 
claims" division of the Ogden City Justice Court, which 
ruled in favor of the municipality on the claimed 
indebtedness. On appeal to the Second Judicial District 
Court in and for Weber County, a bench trial (de novo) was 
held. The District Court ruled in favor of the municipality 
on the claimed indebtedness and entered civil judgment 
against the Defendant in the amount of $3875. This appeal 
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was taken from that judgment. 
The Defendant was never "convicted" in "criminal" court 
of the "violations" under city ordinance, misdemeanors 
he was accused of. There was never any court proceeding in 
which the Defendant's "guilt" of the underlying violation 
was ever established. The original "small claims" proceeding 
and the "trial de novo" proceeding were NOT adjudicated on 
the basis of the underlying guilt of the violation. [Those 
courts did not have jurisdiction over that offense, because 
no Information had been filed. Likewise, the "small claims" 
case was filed as a civil, debt collection case.] Likewise, 
the case was presented by the City as an obligation owed 
cumulatively $3875 for the nine "letters" sent out by 
Officer Porter and the Defendant's inadequate response 
thereto. 
The CITY'S practice of assessing the "per letter" 
charges first $125, then $250, then $500 for each "letter" 
thereafter was described by Officer Porter in his oral 
testimony before the District Court, thus: 
QUESTION (by Assistant City Attorney STRATFORD): 
Okay and how long do you usually wait between 
inspection periods as you go forward? 
ANSWER (by Witness Porter): Municipal code 
provides for 15 days. 
QUESTION: And so it's your policy as a 
municipal appointed inspector to go out about 
every two weeks or so then to see if the issue has 
been resolved? 
12 
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ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: And then did you return to the 
property on or about December 4, 2006? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: I'm handling the witness a picture, 
Your Honor, and a statement dated December 5, 
2006. It's marked as P-2. And again, if you could 
just describe briefly for the Court, had the 
conditions improved at all between these two 
visits? 
ANSWER: No sir, they were exactly alike, 
same appliances, same position. So I issued a $250 
civil citation. 
QUESTION: And is your decision how much that 
citation is or how was that amount determined? 
ANSWER: The violation penalties are 
scheduled in the municipal code. They're set by 
the City Council. 
QUESTION: And then the computer generates that 
based on the frequency of the violation? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 12, Line 15 
through Page 13, Line 14. Emphasis added. A minute or so 
later the witness' testimony was: 
QUESTION: And did you find the violation to be 
a continuing violation? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. The original violation was 
still in place and it had grown. 
QUESTION: And at that date, what happens to 
the penalties associated with the citation? 
ANSWER: The violation was still the same for 
junk and debris. It was not in compliance so I 
issued a third citation. 
QUESTION: And in what amount? 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ANSWER: $500. 
QUESTION: Okay, and after you get your third 
citation does the amount stay the say at $500? 
ANSWER: All subsequent citations after that 
are $500. 
QUESTION: Okay. Now, does the code provide 
only for citations of $500 every two weeks or does 
it provide for more frequent potential 
ANSWER: Municipal code says I can write that 
$500 citation every day. 
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 14, line 10 
through Page 15, line 3. Emphasis added. 
Officer Porter testified he eventually issued nine 
"letter citations", totalling $3875 in "civil fines", for 
the alleged violations, so observed by Officer Porter over 
the extensive period. It was this amount $3875 which the 
CITY sought to recover in the "small claims" action. 
Officer Porter testified the CITY did NOT undertake an 
"abatement" of the situation, by physically removing the 
junk and debris. TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL, at 
Pages 39-40. Code Enforcement Officer Porter's testimony 
was: 
QUESTION (by Defendant's Attorney HOMER): But 
doesn't the state code say if the person doesn't 
clean it up, you put it on his taxes, you send it 
to the county authorities. 
ANSWER (by Witness PORTER) : This says if we abate. 
We did not abate. It was my discretion not to 
abate. I chose not to abate. 
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 40, lines 7 
14 
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through 11. Emphasis added. 
Although Defendant DECKER requested a "hearing" to 
challenge the CITY'S (through Officer Porter) accusations of 
the "junk and debris" (paraphrased) , the CITY refused to 
grant DECKER the requested "hearing" because he did not pay 
the $25 hearing request fee required by city ordinance. Code 
Enforcement Officer Porter testified in the District Court 
bench trial: 
QUESTION (by Defendant's Attorney HOMER): Going 
back to 14 then, Mr. Porter, Paragraph 7, appeal 
process is available and then it says "In the 
event you believe" and that would be I guess the 
person to whom this is issued, "you have been 
issued this citation in error, you may appeal the 
imposition of the civil penalty by filing an 
application for hearing along with a $25 non-
refundable filing fee." That's what that paragraph 
says, right? 
ANSWER (by Witness PORTER): Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: Did Mr. Decker attempt to file an 
application for hearing, do you know? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: Did he pay the $25 filing fee? 
ANSWER: No, sir. 
QUESTION: He didn't. Did the city act on his 
application for hearing? 
ANSWER: By act, did we have the hearing? 
QUESTION: Or decide not to have a hearing? I 
realize that's a dual question. 
ANSWER: No, the hearing was not scheduled 
because he did not pay the application fee. 
QUESTION: Okay. So the city's process is that 
15 
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it costs $25 if you want to challenge these 
accusations against Mr. Decker? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: And all other similarly situated 
persons, right? Everybody who gets a citation, 
civil citation they have to pay the fee? 
ANSWER: Yes, sir. 
QUESTION: Is there any process in the city's 
ordinance for waiving the $25 fee? 
ANSWER: Not to my knowledge. 
TRANSCRIPT OF OCTOBER 2010 BENCH TRIAL. Page 33, line 3 
through Page 34, line 8. Emphasis added. 
I 
THE CITY'S ORDINANCE IMPOSING THE $25 HEARING REQUEST FEE 
AS A PRE-CONDITION TO THE HEARING IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution 
provides, in relevant part: 
. . In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. . . . 
Emphasis added. 
A 
The interplay between Section 7 ["due process"] and 
Section 12 ["the rights herein guaranteed"] is clear, by 
reference to the unambiguous text. Thus, the question 
arises: is the City-required $25 "hearing request fee" in 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order to obtain the "hearing" to adjudicate the accusation 
of the "violation" (in context of the "civil citation") 
constitutional? Phrased differently, can the City require, 
as a pre-condition to obtaining the hearing to challenge the 
"civil citation" accusations against the citizen, the 
payment of a monetary fee? And in the context of this "small 
claims court" civil proceeding, the question then becomes: 
can the City seek and obtain a civil judgment, based upon 
the enforcement officer's administrative assessment (or the 
provisions of the Ordinance themselves) issuance of the 
"letter citation" as a basis for civil liability, in the 
face of the accused's request for hearing? 
The Defendant's answer to those rhetorical questions is 
a resounding "No". 
It is fundamental, even "black-letter" law that "due 
process" generally embodies a "hearing": the "right to be 
heard". On this particular "right to be heard", the Utah 
Supreme Court in V-l Oil Company vs Department of 
Environmental Quality, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997), has 
observed: 
Commentators have noted that accusatory 
proceedings, due to their similarity in both form 
and consequence to formal criminal proceedings, 
require particular attention to due process 
concerns. Allison, Process-Value at 1180. 
Therefore, stricter due process requirements apply 
to adversarial, adjudicative decision making than 
to legislative-type decision making. The most 
fundamental requirement in this context is "the 
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and 
17 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in a meaningful manner.'" Mathews, 424 U.S. at 
333, 96 S.Ct. at 902 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 
380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 
62 (1965) . . . . 
939 P.2d at 1197. Emphasis added. 
The above-quoted comments from the Utah Supreme Court 
indicate the "due process" considerations relevant to the 
"accusatory proceedings" such as OGDEN CITY'S against 
Defendant DECKER. But the government cannot, per Article I, 
Section 12, pre-condition the exercise of an "accused 
person's" constitutional rights by requiring the payment of 
a "hearing fee". 
The constitutional proscription is universal in its 
scope. The language clearly states: "In no instance shall 
any accused person . . .". There are no qualifications or 
limitations to the constitutional proscription. The text 
thereof states "in no instance". Likewise, the CITY should 
not be heard to justify its "civil penalties" processes and 
results when those processes and results have been expressly 
designed and structured to avoid the "constitutional rights" 
the Framers intended. The Court should adopt an expansive 
not restrictive interpretation and application of the 
Framers' intentions, particular when those Framers used 
terminology such as "in no instance" and "any accused 
person". 
In this context, the Court must be aware of the 
"historical" context of things, as applicable to the 
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situation at hand. Historically, "criminal" accusations were 
the customary and only methodology the government utilized 
to proceed against a citizen accused of a crime. In the past 
couple decades, the governmental practice has arisen to 
"accuse" citizens of wrongdoing, but in a manner carefully 
crafted to avoid the "constitutional rights" guaranteed to 
the citizen by the Utah Constitution. Indeed, the Ogden City 
ordinance (ala $500 per "letter citation") and this civil 
proceeding based thereon is just such an example. 
Article B of Section 1-4 of the Ogden City Code 
pertains generally to the "Administrative Imposition of 
Civil Penalties". Section 1-4B-1 thereof states the 
"purpose" thereof, thus: 
The purpose of this article is to provide a 
standardized procedure for the administrative 
imposition of certain civil penalties authorized 
under various sections, articles, chapters or 
titles of this code and to encourage the 
correction of the code violation without resort to 
the criminal courts. 
Emphasis added. 
Section 1-4B-8 of the Ogden City Code provides: 
1-4B-8: PAYMENT: 
Any person issued a civil citation shall within 
twenty (20) days of the date of notice pay the 
civil penalty, unless a written request for a 
hearing is filed pursuant to section 1-4B-10 of 
this article. 
Emphasis added. Section 1-4B-10 of the Ogden City Code, 
pertaining to "Appeals", provides in relevant part: 
1-4B-10: APPEALS: 
19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Request; Application: Any person having 
received a notice of violation or a civil citation 
may request a hearing before a hearing officer by 
filing a written application for a hearing in the 
city recorder's office within (10) days of the 
date of notice.. Hearings shall be conducted as 
provided in title 4, chapter 4, article A of this 
code. All applications for hearing shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the notice of violation 
and the fee established in section 4-6-1 of this 
code. 
Emphasis added. This is the Ordinance provision, together 
with the $25 hearing request fee required by Section 4-6-1, 
which is "core" to this issue. 
The Defendant DECKER attempted to file the written 
request for hearing, but the CITY refused to process his 
request because he failed to pay the $25 hearing request 
fee. Because no hearing was ever held, the administratively 
imposed "civil penalties" assessed originally by Code 
Enforcement Officer Porter (in his original "letter 
citations") in the aggregate amount of $3875 stood, thus 
prompting the civil actions to collect such 
amounts.FOOTNOTE1 
xThere is a fundamental problem substantively with the 
CITY'S claim for the assessment of the "civil penalty" against 
the Defendant. Although subsection "A" of Section 1-4A-1 of the 
Ogden City Code identifies and provides for the standard 
"criminal" penalties for "violations" of the municipality's 
ordinances, subsection "B" additionally provides for "civil 
penalties". It is presumed that these provisions subsection "B 
of Section 1-4A-1 of the Ogden City Code are relied upon to 
justify the administrative imposition of the "civil penalties" 
against Defendant DECKER in this case. 
The City's reliance thereon is flawed, in light of the 
express language of the ordinance provision, which states in 
relevant part: 
B. Civil Penalties: 
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Because the constitutional proscription is clearly 
implicated and violated by the Ordinance, the Ordinance is 
unconstitutional. 
Because the civil judgment entered against the 
Defendant is based upon an administrative process thus 
presumptively defective (lack of "due process" hearing, 
because the "hearing request fee" was not paid, as per the 
Ordinance now unconstitutional) , the civil judgment of $3875 
is invalid and must be set aside. 
Numerous Utah appellate court decisions have 
consistently invalidated municipal ordinances in 
contravention to constitutional proscriptions and 
protections. See, for example, State by and through Hansen 
vs Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (Utah 1968) 
[ordinance conflicting with constitutional guarantees 
(Fourth Amendment) is invalid] ; Salt Lake City vs Wheeler, 
24 Utah 2d 112, 466 P.2d 838 (Utah 1970) [ordinance 
conflicting with constitutional guarantees (Fourth 
Amendment) is invalid] ; Weber Basin Homebuilders Association 
vs Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971), 
1. In addition to the penalties provided above, a 
court upon conviction may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense, other than a violation of title 10 of 
this code, to a civil penalty in the following amounts: 
Emphasis added. In the instant situation, there were no "court" 
proceedings resulting in a "conviction". Code Enforcement Officer 
Porter is not "a court". The City's administrative imposition of 
the "civil penalty" is fundamentally flawed, for substantive 
reasons. 
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i 
[excessive building permit fee used for general revenue 
violates constitutional standards]. ( 
A district court's ruling regarding the 
constitutionality of a regulatory fee is a mixed question of 
law and fact; it is reviewed under a clearly erroneous * 
standard for questions of fact and a correctness standard 
for questions of law. D.D.A. vs State (State ex rel D.A,), 
2009 UT 83, 222 P.3d 1172 (Utah 2009), Tooele Associates 
Limited Partnership vs Tooele City Corporation, 2011 UT 04, 
247 P. 3d 371 (Utah Supreme Court 2011) . A local government's 
fee setting procedure may be tested against an arbitrary, 
capricious or illegal standard of review, but a 
reasonableness test to determine that the actual fee is < 
invalid. Walker vs Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993). 
The presumption of constitutionality attaching to a local 
government ordinance can be overcome if the challenger shows { 
the regulatory fee is "so unreasonable and disproportionate 
to the services rendered as to attack the good faith of the 
law" . V-1 Oil Company vs Utah State Tax Commission, 94 2 P. 2d 
906 (Utah 1997) . 
In the instant situation, the Ogden City "civil 
citation" fine of $500 every time the code enforcement 
officer sends out the "letter citation" for the claimed 
"violation" (which is itself never actually litigated) is 
"so unreasonable and disproportionate to the services 
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rendered" that the Ordinance can be attacked. If the $500 
"fine" is allowed, especially in the face of the 
requirements of Section 10-11-1 of the Utah Code (actual 
costs of clean-up can be recovered) , there would be no limit 
to the amount of money the CITY could collect. In extreme 
cases, the CITY could fund the entirety of its governmental 
operations from such "fees", while never actually incurring 
any actual cost or expense, because the statutorily-required 
"clean up" was never effected. 
While the "civil penalty" assessed and imposed against 
Defendant DECKER is hardly a "tax" or even a "fee for 
service" and for that reason the jurisprudence and 
analysis of Tooele Associates and cases cited therein may 
not be directly applicable the "constitutional" principles 
discussed therein are seemingly relevant to the situation at 
hand. This is particularly the situation given the fact that 
the CITY actually incurred no expenses in the non-existent 
clean-up (as described by statute) and that the $500 per 
letter "civil penalty" bears absolutely no relationship to 
those non-existent expenses. Simply stated, the $500 "civil 
penalty" administratively assessed by Code Enforcement 
Officer Porter is unconstitutionally excessive and 
impermissible, as a matter of law. 
B 
The constitutional "due process" violation comes into 
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( 
play as a result of the generalized application of the "$500 
per letter citation" civil fine imposed for the < 
"violations", not otherwise criminally prosecuted. The 
Defendant has a "constitutional right" under Article I, 
Section 7 not to be deprived of his "property" (in this 
case, his money: the $500, or in the aggregate, the $3875) 
without "due process of law". 
In the instant situation, the provisions of Section 10-
11-1 et seq, Utah Code, come into play. [The complete text 
of Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code, is included herein as . 
ATTACHMENT 1 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] Those statutory 
provisions provide for the mandatory (the word "shall" is 
consistently used throughout the chapter) procedure in cases ( 
where municipal inspectors observed "junk and debris" on 
privately-owned lots within the geopolitical jurisdictional 
boundaries of the municipality. Such should have been the 
situation here. But rather than complying with the statute 
(i.e. notice to the propertyowner, followed by clean-up, 
with the expenses thereof being placed "on the taxes" with 
an "appeal" thereof to the County Commission), Officer 
Porter just "cranks out" the citation letters. Such a . 
process in clear contradiction to the statute ought to be 
"unconstitutional" : that is, the municipality of OGDEN CITY, 
not having the attributes of sovereignty, must obey the ( 
statutes which are applicable to it. If it fails to do so in 
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its dealings with its citizens, the citizen's "due process 
of law" rights are violated. 
Section 10-11-2, Utah Code, provides in relevant part: 
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to 
make careful examination and investigation, as may 
be provided by ordinance, of the growth and spread 
of such injurious and noxious weeds, and of 
garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious 
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to 
ascertain the names of the owners . . . 
Emphasis added. 
Section 10-11-3 continues to describe the "mandatory" 
(through the legislative text) process applicable in the 
event the propertyowner fails to respond to the "notice" to 
clean up the property. Section 10-11-3 provides in relevant 
part: 
If any owner or occupant of lands described in 
such notice shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or 
destroy and remove, such weeds, garbage, refuse, 
object or structure upon the premises in 
accordance with such note, it shall be the duty of 
the inspector, at the expense of the municipality/ 
to employ necessary assistance and cause such 
weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures to 
be removed or destroyed. He shall prepare an 
itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the 
removal and destruction of the same and shall mail 
a copy thereof to the owner demanding payment 
within twenty days of the date of mailing. . . . 
Emphasis added. Section 10-11-3 continues by stating that 
the inspector (and his employing municipality) may bring 
civil litigation to recover the costs of the removal, 
including reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The statute 
also authorizes the inspector to submit the claim for 
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reimbursement of the municipality's expenses to county 
taxing authorities, for inclusion in the real property 
taxes. Again, the mandatory verb "shall" is utilized. 
Section 10-11-4 provides for an opportunity for the 
propertyowner to challenge the municipality's claims, in a 
hearing before the county commission. 
The "bottom line" to all this is this: 
1. The municipality, in this precise "weeds and 
debris" (paraphrased) situation, is obligated to 
actually incur the expense of clean-up. 
2. Correspondingly, the accused propertyowner is 
legislatively-entitled to pay only those amounts 
which were incurred by the municipality in the 
actual clean-up of the parcel. 
In the instant situation, there was no clean-up. The CITY 
incurred no expenses. 
Thus, Defendant DECKER is not liable for any payment 
(to the CITY) for the non-existent expenses (of clean-up) 
the CITY did not incur. The CITY'S attempt to collect the 
"$500 per letter" fee ("civil penalty"), at $3875 greatly in 
excess of the $0 amount actually incurred by the CITY in its 
conscious decision to not effect the clean-up, contravenes 
DECKER'S statutory rights (the he pays for the clean-up 
expenses). The CITY'S attempt to impose and collect "civil 
penalties" in excess of the amounts prescribed by 
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controlling statute (which says, essentially, $0) violates 
the Defendant's "constitutional rights" of "due process of 
law" under Article I, Section 7. 
It is paradoxical, even ironic, that in this situation 
the CITY is, within the administrative "letter citation" 
process, accusing Defendant DECKER of violating the "weeds 
and debris" ordinances (and is thus liable for the payment 
of "civil penalty") when the CITY itself is unwilling to 
accept and comply with the requirements of "the law" 
directly and specifically applicable to the "weeds and 
debris" situation: the provisions of Section 10-11-3, Utah 
Code, legislatively mandated upon the CITY for this exact 
situation. 
II 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS TAKEN PURSUANT TO 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
As shown above, the CITY'S actions in denying the 
Defendant's request for hearing violates Article I, Section 
7 of the Utah Constitution. Thus, the administrative 
imposition of the $3875 in civil fines against the Defendant 
is fundamentally defective and invalid. That administrative 
action must be set aside and vacated. See West Valley City 
vs Foy, 100 P. 3d 275 (Utah Court of Appeals 2004) [tenant's 
timely-filed request for hearing precluded summary judgment 
in favor of municipality for claimed administrative fines 
imposed in spite of request for hearing]. 
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Ill 
THE CIVIL JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST DEFENDANT 
IS INVALID 
Because the underlying administrative claim (of 
indebtedness owing in the amount of $3 875) is invalid by 
reason of the CITY'S unconstitutional denial of the 
Defendant's constitutional right of due process, the 
District Court's civil judgment based upon that 
administrative determination is invalid. The District Court 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff CITY and against the 
Defendant DECKER in the amount of $3875 should be set aside 
and the case remanded to the District Court for dismissal of 
the action. 
CONCLUSION 
The CITY'S Ordinance providing for the administrative 
imposition of civil fines in the face of the accused 
citizen's request for hearing to challenge those impositions 
is unconstitutional. The imposed civil fines 
administratively assessed are thus invalid. The civil case 
filed by the CITY to judicially collect those invalidly 
imposed administrative fines is correspondingly defective, 
and the monetary judgment entered therein must be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of June, 2011. 
At/orrvey for Defendant 
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10-10-1 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE 408 f 
(b) by imposing the appropriate civil penalty adopted 
under the authority of this section. 2005 
CHAPTER 10 
CITIES OF FIRST AND SECOND CLASS [REPEALED] 
10-10-1 to 10-10-75. Repealed. 1961,1977,1979,1988 
CHAPTER 11 
INSPECTION AND CLEANING 
Section 
10-11-1. Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, and un-
sightly objects. 
10-11-2. Notice to property owners. 
10-11-3. Neglect of property owners — Removal by city — 
Costs of removal. 
10-11-4. Costs of removal to be included in tax notice. 
10-11-1. Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, and un-
sightly objects. 
A municipal legislative body may designate, and regulate 
the abatement of, injurious and noxious weeds, garbage, 
refuse, or any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures, 
and may appoint a municipal inspector for the purpose of 
carrying out the provisions of this chapter. 2003 
10-11-2. Notice to property owners. 
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to make careful 
examination and investigation, as may be provided by ordi-
nance, of the growth and spread of such injurious and noxious 
weeds, and of garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious 
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to ascertain the 
names of the owners and descriptions of the premises where 
such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures exist, and to 
serve notice in writing upon the owner or occupant of such 
land, either personally or by mailing notice, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the owner or occupant at the last known post-
office address as disclosed by the records of the county asses-
sor, requiring such owner or occupant, as the case may be, to 
eradicate, or destroy and remove, the same within such time 
as the inspector may designate, which shall not be less than 
ten days from the date of service of such notice. One notice 
shall be deemed sufficient on any lot or parcel of property for 
the entire season of weed growth during that year. The 
inspector shall make proof of service of such notice under oath, 
and file the same in the office of the county treasurer. 1953 
10-11-3. Neglect of property owners — Removal by city 
— Costs of removal. 
(1) (a) If any owner or occupant of lands described in the 
notice under Section 10-11-2 fails or neglects to eradicate, 
or destroy and remove, the weeds, garbage, refuse, ob-
jects, or structure upon the premises in accordance with 
the notice, the inspector shall: 
(i) at the expense of the municipality, employ nec-
essary assistance and cause the weeds, garbage, 
refuse, objects, or structures to be removed or de-
stroyed; and 
(ii) prepare an itemized statement of all expenses, 
including administrative expenses, incurred in the 
removal and destruction of the weeds, garbage, re-
fuse, objects, or structures and mail a copy of the 
statement to the owner demanding payment within 
30 days of the date of mailing. 
(b) Each notice under Subsection (l)(a) shall be consid-
ered delivered when mailed by certified mail addressed to 
the property owner's last-knnwn aHHrpac 
(2) (a) If the owner fails to make payment of the amount 
set forth in the statement to the municipal treasurer 
within the required 30 days, the inspector, on behalf of the 
municipality, may: 
(i) cause suit to be brought in an appropriate court 
of law; or 
(ii) refer the matter to the county treasurer as 
provided in Subsection (2)(c). 
(b) If collection of the costs are pursued through the 
courts, the municipality may: 
(i) sue for and receive judgment upon all of the 
costs of removal and destruction, including adminis-
trative costs, together with reasonable attorneys' 
fees, interest, and court costs; and 
(ii) execute on the judgment in the manner pro-
vided by law. 
(c) If the inspector elects to refer the matter to the 
county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the 
property owner, the inspector shall: 
(i) make, in triplicate, an itemized statement of all 
expenses, including administrative expenses, in-
curred in the removal and destruction of the weeds, 
garbage, refuse, objects, or structures; and 
(ii) deliver the three copies of the statement to the 
county treasurer within ten days after the expiration 
of the 30-day period provided in the statement under 
Subsection (l)(a)(ii). 2005 
10-11-4. Costs of removal to be included in tax notice. 
Upon receipt of the itemized statement of the cost of 
destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects, 
or structures, the county treasurer shall forthwith mail one 
copy to the owner of the land from which the same were 
removed, together with a notice that objection in writing may 
be made within 30 days to the whole or any part of the 
statement so filed to the county legislative body. The county 
treasurer shall at the same time deliver a copy of the state-
ment to the clerk of the county legislative body. If objections to 
any statement are filed with the county legislative body, they 
shall set a date for hearing, giving notice thereof, and upon the 
hearing fix and determine the actual cost of removing the 
weeds, garbage, refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or 
structures, and report their findings to the county treasurer. If 
no objections to the items of the account so filed are made 
within 30 days of the date of mailing such itemized statement, 
the county treasurer shall enter the amount of such statement 
on the assessment rolls of the county in the column prepared 
for that purpose, and likewise within ten days from the date of 
the action of the county legislative body upon objections filed 
shall enter in the prepared column upon the tax rolls the 
amount found by the county legislative body as the cost of 
removing and destroying the said weeds, refuse, garbage or 
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures. If current tax 
notices have been mailed, said taxes may be carried over on 
the rolls to the following year. After the entry by the county 
treasurer of the costs of removing weeds, garbage, refuse or 
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures the amount so 
entered shall have the force and effect of a valid judgment of 
the district court, and shall be a lien upon the lands from 
which the weeds, refuse, garbage or unsightly and deleterious 
objects or structures were removed and destroyed, and shall 
be collected by the county treasurer at the time of the payment 
of general taxes. Upon payment thereof receipt shall be 
acknowledged upon the general tax receipt issued by the 
treasurer. 1993 
CHAPTER 12 
BUDGET SYSTEM IN CITIES OF THIRD CLASS 
[REPEALED] 
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